The Horn of Africa occupies a strategically important position at the intersection of Africa, Asia, and Europe. Overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow maritime corridor connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The region is central to international trade, maritime security, and geopolitical competition. Yet, despite its strategic significance, the Horn of Africa has become increasingly vulnerable to protracted armed conflicts, communal violence, political fragmentation, and escalating cross-border tensions. These interconnected crises have fueled insurgencies, weakened state institutions, and generated successive waves of forced displacement across the region. Moreover, the region’s pivotal state, Ethiopia, a socio-economic giant, is rapidly degenerating into chaos due to armed conflicts raging across four corners of the country. Unless the international community takes prompt actions, the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia could ultimately lead to state collapse, resulting in regional humanitarian crisis with far-reaching global consequences.
The scale of the humanitarian crisis in the region is already alarming. Sudan’s ongoing civil war has generated one of the world’s largest displacement emergencies, with approximately 14 million people affected by displacement. Somalia, meanwhile, continues to grapple with recurrent conflict and prolonged internal displacement. Instability in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula has important implications for maritime security as it triggers refugee exodus across the Red Sea. According to UNHCR’s October 2026 assessment, approximately 4,200 people had crossed from Yemen to Djibouti and Somalia since September 2026, amid renewed insecurity and displacement in the country. If similar refugee flights occur from Ethiopia, the crisis will only worsen and have a more profound impact.
Red Sea security is contingent upon the security of its shores
The ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Yemen have been contributing significantly to the disruption of the global container trade and energy supply, which began in February 2026 due to the closure of the Hormuz Strait. Unfortunately, the international community seems only concerned with the freedom of navigation through the sea, overlooking the crucial fact that peace at sea is contingent upon the security of its shores. if left unaddressed, the unfolding insecurity across the Horn risks generating consequences that extend well beyond the region as it directly affects the security condition in the Red Sea. So far, only Eritrea and Djibouti have comparatively avoided internal armed conflicts afflicting the rest of the countries in the region. Nevertheless, regional stability remains exceptionally fragile, particularly with the potential for the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia to spill across national borders. Indeed, with a population exceeding 130 million and thousands of kilometers of shared borders with countries in the region, Ethiopia holds a pivotal position. Thus, given its vast size and strategic location, any full-blown chaos in Ethiopia has far-reaching regional repercussions.
Inaction amidst unfolding chaos only serves as a prelude to state collapse:
Ironically, the current situation in Ethiopia bears a striking resemblance to Somalia’s experience in the years preceding the collapse of its central government in 1991. In Somalia, the international community failed to prevent the progressive deterioration of political institutions and subsequently the country descended into a full-fledged civil war. The consequence of inaction was devastating: millions of Somalis forced to flee their homeland to various parts of the world, warlords gained unchecked influence in the country, and piracy became a persistent threat to international freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian ocean. More than three decades later, efforts to reconstitute the central government remains elusive due to competing regional and tribal power centers.
Unfortunately, the spiraling insecurity in Ethiopia has been leading the country to a similar path. The Congressional Research Service’s November 2026 assessment about the country identifies the proliferation of armed opposition, deteriorating relations with Eritrea, and growing regional tensions as significant threats to Ethiopia’s stability. Devastating war is raging unabated in Tigray, Amhara, Afar, and Oromia regions, while other parts of the country are also experiencing low-scale conflicts, displacing millions of people, and exacerbating the already dire humanitarian crisis in the country. In October 2026 alone, as a result of the conflict in Moyale area, over 50,000 civilians fled to neighboring Kenya. The dispute stemmed from a long-standing competing territorial and administrative claim between the Somali and Oromo regional government, reportedly supported by the Federal government forces. The exodus triggered by this single incident illustrates how localized political dispute in Africa’s second most populous nation can rapidly generate cross-border humanitarian emergencies. Indeed, this is not merely a speculative concern. It reflects the tangible regional consequences of Ethiopia’s existing conflicts and the country’s growing institutional vulnerabilities.
Five Interconnected Drivers of State Fragility in Ethiopia:
Broadly speaking, Ethiopia is facing five interconnected drivers of state fragility that could accelerate its trajectory towards state collapse. Firstly, Ethiopia lacks a unifying political leadership capable of articulating a shared national agenda. The ruling Prosperity Party is predominantly composed of Oromo elites, which hinders its ability to represent diverse communities and competing political interests in the country. Moreover, the Oromo elite’s relationship with their Amhara and Tigrayan counterparts is largely adversarial, primarily due to historical factors. The Amhara and Tigrayans held positions of power in previous governments that have marginalized the Oromo for almost a century. Instead of addressing these historical grievances through an inclusive political settlement, the Oromo elites have adopted a policy of vengeance and retribution. This has further polarized the nation, trapping it in a persistent cycle of conflicts.
Second, constitutionally entrenched identity politics is undermining the country’s political and institutional cohesion. In this respect, ethnic federalism and particularly the consequential article 39 of the constitution which was introduced in 1995 by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated government is the elephant in the room. Rather than promoting inclusion and harmony, it promoted identity politics, incentivized ethnonationalist competition, fostered localized elite capture, and weakened the development of a shared national political identity. Thirdly, persistent insurgencies and the proliferation of competing armed authorities are producing an increasingly fragmented political landscape. Since 2022, insurgents have established territorial control over vast territories, challenging the authority of the central government. This has resulted in a de facto fragmentation of the nation and the emergence of competing centers of political and military authority, undermining the institutional coherence of the Ethiopian state. Consequently, the federal government has effectively lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Fourthly, under PM Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s foreign policy is largely driven by external geopolitical interests, which is undermining the country’s strategic autonomy and its regional relationships. Ethiopia’s pursuit of sovereign sea access through any means mirrors the UAE’s regional port imperialism rather than a genuine need for commercial sea outlet for a country with multiple option of access to the sea, unlike other landlocked nations worldwide. Apparently, the UAE is attempting to regain access to the Red Sea shores through Ethiopia, having been denied access by coastal states including Eritrea and Djibouti. Similarly, Ethiopia’s support for the UAE sponsored militia, the Rapid Support Force (RSF) in Sudan runs counter to the best interest of the country. Indeed, any prolonged conflict in Sudan threatens cross-border security, humanitarian stability, trade, and the security of vital Ethiopian infrastructure, including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Fifthly, the credibility of PM Abiy’s leadership in dealing with local and regional political actors has been eroded due to his persistent policy reversals. He had promised to abide by the Algiers Peace Agreement of 2000 and signed the Asmara/Jeddah Peace Agreements with Eritrea in 2019. Likewise, he concluded the Pretoria Peace Agreement with the TPLF in 2022. However, he later retracted all the promises he made without considering the potential national repercussions. Above all, Abiy is a cynical realist who makes decisions solely based on his narrow political interest. His failure to deliver on promises of regional peace and national reconciliation has only deepened internal fractures. Consequently, Ethiopia is on the verge of total collapse—facing the risk of ‘Somalisation’ or a Yugoslav-style disintegration.
To avert this catastrophe, the international community must intensify its engagement with PM Abiy Ahmed and ensure his commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, as stipulated in international law. He should cease aggressive policies and rhetorical coercion against domestic political rivals and neighboring states. Otherwise, Ethiopia could implode at any moment due to the escalating conflicts and external interference he is recklessly provoking through his aggressive regional posture.
