India is chairing the 18th BRICS Summit for the fourth time on 12th to 13th of September 2026 in Delhi. It is also the 20th anniversary year of BRICS. The theme for India’s BRICS Summit is “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” Will there be insurmountable obstacles to realising these lofty thematic ideals? Are there some irreconcilable issues confronting New Delhi as it steers the course of the proceedings? Can New Delhi position itself as a “bridge builder” between the Global North and the Global South? Can it give a “new form” to BRICS at this summit? Can India advance BRICS with a focus on “humanity first”? With a unique opportunity to provide direction and build synergy among member countries to reshape the utility of this bloc in these turbulent times, can India stand with the Global South in the face of unjust US imperialism? It is, of course, presumptuous to pass judgement on the outcomes at this stage.
Discussions are also likely to be watched closely by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and US President Donald Trump. Sanjay Kapoor, in an article entitled “BRICS in Delhi: Make or Break for India, Caught Between Two Boats,” has raised the question of whether the Indian Government will have to search for answers that go beyond its claim of strategic autonomy—a policy that has, over the years, meant different things to different countries.
As reported in Orissa Post on September 4, 2026, the US has warned of sanctions following the Modi–Pezeshkian meeting at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Marco Rubio, US Secretary of State, is reported to have said that
“no country should be out there helping them [Iran] create mechanisms by which they can generate revenue that they will then use to sponsor terrorism and try to build a nuclear weapon.” This was a veiled threat to India and others who may be seen as siding with Iran.
Prime Minister Modi reiterated India’s commitment to strengthening its long-standing friendship with Iran and expressed a desire to expand and diversify the bilateral trade basket in the times to come. He also said that the two leaders discussed the prevailing situation in the region and assured India’s support for efforts aimed at ensuring lasting peace. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal clarified that the discussions focused on the protection of commercial shipping and the safety of seafarers and civilians amid the ongoing conflict in West Asia.
The Bishkek Declaration of the SCO, dated September 1, 2016, condemned the US-Israel attack on Iran, reaffirmed support for the territorial integrity of Iran, backed Iran’s rights as a member of the NPT, condemned Israeli aggression, and pledged to implement the SCO Economic Development Strategy for the period up to 2030. The declaration also expressed support for an open, transparent, fair, inclusive and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system based on generally accepted international principles and rules that promote global economic development, ensure fair market access, and provide special and differential treatment for developing countries. SCO members also expressed support for the expansion of inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy sector and agreed to implement the “SCO Member States’ Energy Cooperation Strategy to 2030.”
At the 18th BRICS Summit, can India afford to back out of the agreed commitments of the SCO should other members introduce a resolution along the lines of the Bishkek Declaration? Is this not a strategy to outmanoeuvre India in its own game of strategic autonomy?
Yet another irritant for the Indian chairship would perhaps be Iran’s view of New Delhi’s dilly-dallying approach in not pressing harder to end the US-Israel war. Tehran, it may be recalled, joined BRICS in 2024 and has been calling on the group to take stronger action regarding the war. On the other hand, Iranian attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia have created a curious dilemma for the group.India plays a critical role in navigating the complex landscape within BRICS. Balancing the internal contradictions among its members is a challenging task for India, particularly given the potential risks of the bloc becoming more China-centric or being perceived as anti-Western.
Hemant Adlakha, in an article entitled
“Experts Explain: Why Xi Jinping May Be Keeping India Guessing Over His BRICS Summit Participation,”
has explained why Xi’s participation remains uncertain. Derek Grossman, writing for the China Global South Project, is said to have observed that a range of issues—including further relaxation of Indian restrictions on Chinese investment and business, visas and direct connectivity, as well as Tibetan and Taiwan issues—will determine the relationship between the two BRICS members. Their resolution in a favourable direction may determine Xi’s participation in the Delhi Summit. Grossman further adds that China wants assurances that New Delhi is not using normalisation with China merely tactically while deepening its military alignment with Washington.
The standardisation of 27 names in Arunachal Pradesh by India earlier in August evoked a strong reaction from a section of China’s strategic experts. Earlier, too, India had rejected China’s renaming of places in Arunachal Pradesh in the most unambiguous terms, viewing it as an attempt to reinforce territorial claims. Little wonder, then, that a Chinese senior fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies described this step as evidence that India’s position remained entrenched despite recent efforts to improve bilateral relations.
On August 11, China Daily similarly commented:
“The history of the China-India boundary itself calls for caution rather than political posturing.”
A widely read foreign-affairs blogger is also said to have written:
“By attacking China on the eve of the upcoming BRICS meet, does Modi think that by acting first, he has the upper hand?”
These reactions have to be read in the wider context of the bilateral relationship between the two countries and how China might take a stance on other issues at the Delhi Summit, particularly regarding the adoption of some of the contentious issues raised at the recent SCO meeting.
The geopolitical landscape of West Asia is undergoing a violent structural shift. Washington under Trump is recalibrating its global commitments and creating a profound security vacuum. This posture has sparked a scramble among regional satraps for durable security guarantees. They are seeking alternative and dependable security partners who can stand with one another. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey in a collective defence arrangement, is a case in point.
Sashi Tharoor, in an article entitled
“The Gulf Is Calling and New Delhi Must Listen,”
published in The Hindu on September 5, 2026, has cautioned that, for India, West Asia is not merely a strategic choice but an imperative for national security. India cannot afford to view West Asia simply as an economic hinterland and rest on a “multi-alignment” approach in times of regional crisis, particularly in the context of the US-Israel war on Iran.
Trump’s claim over the Strait of Hormuz as US territory is another contentious issue likely to surface at the Delhi Summit. How India, as chair, is going to tackle this tricky situation remains a crucial question beyond its claim of strategic autonomy—a policy that has, over the years, meant different things to different countries. The climate agenda is increasingly shifting from discussions about the pace of emissions reductions towards practical adaptation measures.
The challenge before BRICS is how to formulate a joint financial architecture capable of matching the momentum of the clean-energy transition while outnumbering planned fossil-fuel plants. The Morning Express, dated September 5, 2026, has suggested three specific mechanisms for the transition.
First, BRICS can amplify the reach of Project Bridge, the blockchain-enabled multi-CBDC platform developed by BRICS central banks, as a settlement layer for climate-finance transactions, thereby reducing dollar intermediation and transaction costs for cross-border green investment within the bloc.
Second, India may push for a formal framework for strategically utilising Gulf sovereign wealth-fund co-investment in NDB climate projects.
Third, BRICS could accelerate the rupee-bond programme across BRICS currencies, leveraging India’s expertise in building large-scale, low-cost public infrastructure.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect (North London News) editorial policy.
